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ABSTRACT: It is widely accepted by formal and informal logicians alike that a formal logic which, by the 
lights of English, gets the connectives wrong, nevertheless conspires to get entailment right—right that is,  
modulo English. There is a vexing problem occasioned by this semantic alienation of formal logic. It is 
next to impossible for formal logic to meet the expectations of realism. What, then, of informal logic? 
1. CONCEPT SIMILARITY 
Informal logicians exhibit an interesting ambivalence towards deduction and its logic. 
They acknowledge that deductive validity is a good property for an argument or piece of 
reasoning to have. There is also an equable consensus about what that property is. Some-
times the affection for validity runs to favouritism. Many an informal logician thinks that 
validity is the best of the good-making ties between an argument’s premisses and its con-
clusion.
1
 Informal logicians have a corresponding fondness for the logic of deduction. 
There is wide agreement that formal deductive logic produces a satisfactory, indeed ex-
emplary, account of the property of validity or equivalently, of the relation of logical en-
tailment.  
 Despite this amity with the deductive, another distinctive feature of the informal 
logic movement has been its dissatisfaction with formal logic. In saying so, a certain cau-
tion is necessary. When informal logicians lay the charge of inadequacy against deductive 
logic, they are finding fault with it notwithstanding their belief that it gives the right ac-
count of that subject’s most central target concept. Where, then, is the trouble to be 
found? It is to be found in the schematization manual that takes sentences from subsets of 
English to well-formed formulas (wffs) of the formal calculus of the logic. A particular 
part of this worry—though not by any means the whole of it2—has to do with the entirely 
correct observation that the connectives of deductive logic distort the meanings of their 
English counterparts.  
 This is embarrassing. At least, it is embarrassing on its face. The connectives of 
formal deductive logic are included in its logical particles. The system is designed in 
such a way that the logical particles play a semantically indispensable role in specifying 
the entailment relation. But now we must ask, “How is this possible?” How is it possible 
to get entailment right if the very same system gets entailment’s logical particles wrong? 
                                                 
1
  Inductive strength comes second in such rankings, with connections of lesser robustness bringing up the 
rear—abductive implication, conductive implication, defeasible implication, and on and on. 
2
  It is a big and tricky problem, too much to be dealt with here. Interested readers may wish to consult 
Woods (2004: chapter 3). 
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How does one get anything right by getting something else wrong? This is an issue im-
portant enough to have a name. I propose that we call it the Right-Wrong Problem. 
 There is, of course, an intuitive answer (of sorts) to the Right-Wrong Problem. It 
is that while logic gets the logical particles wrong, there is nevertheless enough similarity 
between how they actually are and how they are represented by logicians to defeat the 
supposition that the Right-Wrong asymmetry is a genuine problem. This is not a silly 
idea. But before we take to it with theoretical seriousness, we should specify this relation 
of purported similarity and demonstrate its key properties. As a first attempt, I shall call 
upon the concept of semantic penumbra, to be introduced just below. 
 Virtually everyone agrees that it is at least a necessary condition of the entail-
ment of ψ by Φ that it not be possible that Φ and not-ψ. With a nod to its lineage in logics 
of strict implication, let’s call this the strict condition on entailment. Classical and modal 
logicians see the strict condition as also sufficient for entailment. So far as I can tell, so 
do most informal logicians. Relevant and paraconsistent logicians plump for its necessity 
only. There is no urgency to adjudicate this conflict here. Suffice it to say that virtually 
everyone agrees that in advancing the strict condition, a logic takes a considerable stride 
in getting the entailment relation right.  
2. SEMANTIC PENUMBRA 
To see how Right-Wrong arises, it would be useful to consider classical first order logic 
(CFL). For present purposes we might just as well have chosen a modal system such as 
S5. I will have occasion to mention S5 later in the talk. But everyone is familiar with 
CFL. So we’re starting with it. Everyone also agrees on CFL’s principal target. CFL’s job 
is to provide clear and rigorous definitions of a family of interlocking notions centering 
around the relation of logical entailment, to demonstrate the key properties of these no-
tions and, to the degree possible, facilitate their recognition. A significant factor in per-
forming these tasks is that CFL’s target properties are defined for syntactic constructions 
from the system’s formal language. Key to it all is the semantic interpretation the system 
attaches to its logical particles: ~, , , , , , for each of which in turn there is a pur-
ported counterpart in English: “not”, “and”, “or”, “if  then”, “if and only if” and 
“some”. If getting entailment (etc.) right is CFL’s principal target, dealing with negation, 
conjunction, disjunction, conditionality, biconditionality and existential quantification is 
CFL’s subsidiary target.3  
 No one seriously supposes that the connectives and their respective counterparts 
mean the same. There is no sense of “if  then” in English for which Φ’s falsity verifies 
⌐If Φ then ψ¬ for arbitrary ψ, and for which ψ’s truth verifies that same conditional. That 
is there is no sense of “if  then” in English in which ⌐Φ  ψ¬ says ⌐If Φ then ψ¬. 
 Even CFL’s negation doesn’t quite fit negation in English. Russell noted long 
ago that there is a use of “not” in English in which ⌐Not-Φ¬ can be true even though Φ is 
not false. (Φ might be “The present king of France is bald” (Russell 1905)). 
                                                 
3
  This is not to say that the sentential operators aren’t interesting. Jennings (1994) is very good book on 
disjunction and Horn (1989) is the same for negation. The point is that the job of a theory of deduction 
is to get deduction right. It is not the job of a theory of deduction to pronounce upon negation save in 
ways that may facilitate its progress with deduction (which in its semantic sense is what entailment is). 
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 We have it, then, that CFL gets the English particles wrong—not dead wrong 
perhaps, but wrong enough to notice. Yet there is a substantial consensus that it gets en-
tailment right.
4
 But why would this be so? How could a logic that gets “if  then” wrong 
turn out to get “is a consequence of” right? (Whereupon the Right-Wrong Problem.) 
The answer that I will now consider is that the CFL-connectives are in the “semantic pe-
numbra” of their counterpart expressions in English. Consider first the case in which the 
semantic gap between a CFL connective and its counterpart in English is starkest: “” 
and “if  then”. Notwithstanding their difference, they exhibit a similarity: 
 The truth of ⌐~(Φ  ~ψ)¬ is necessary and sufficient for the truth of ⌐Φ  ψ¬, and 
is necessary though not sufficient for the truth of 
⌐If Φ then ψ¬. 
Accordingly, we may say that, while “” and “if  then” don’t mean the same, “” is in 
the semantic penumbrum of “if  then”.  
 Consider next the less dissonant case of negation. 
 The falsity of Φ is necessary and sufficient for the truth of ⌐~Φ¬, and is sufficient 
but not necessary for the truth of 
⌐
Not-Φ¬. 
Accordingly, while “~” and “not” don’t mean the same, “~” is in the semantic penum-
brum of “not”. 
 The cases generalize: Let K
F 
be a logical particle of a logical system and K
E 
its 
counterpart in English. Then K
F 
is in the semantic penumbrum of K
E 
just in case either 
(1) there is a condition necessary and sufficient for the truth of a KF-statement that is 
sufficient but not necessary for the truth of the counterpart K
E
-statement; or 
(2) there is a condition necessary and sufficient for the truth of a KF-statement which 
is necessary but not sufficient for the truth of the counterpart K
E
-statement. 
In my dictionary, one of the listings for “penumbrum” is any area of partial shade. Some-
thing of that meaning is preserved here, with formal terms occupying the lighter areas in 
the partial semantic shade of their English counterparts. 
 Semantic penumbra reflect an interesting suggestion about getting things right. 
We’ve already noticed that, speaking loosely, getting the particles right seems not to be a 
condition on CFL’s getting entailment right. If we wanted to say this more accurately, we 
could propose that what our examples show is that if you want to get entailment right, it is 
not necessary to get your logical particles as right. It suffices that you get them right enough.  
 Semantic penumbra offer a test of this enoughness. You’ve handled your logical 
particles well enough if they are in the semantic penumbra of their respective counter-
parts in English. Let us call this the semantic penumbrum thesis.
5
 Could the semantic 
penumbrum thesis be the answer we want for the Right-Wrong Problem? 
                                                 
4
  In CFL Φ entails ψ just in case there is no valuation making Φ true on any interpretation that doesn’t 
also make ψ true on that interpretation. More loosely, there is no possible way of making Φ true without 
making ψ true. This, of course, is the strict condition. 
5
  Of course, CFL doesn’t need “”. It can get by perfectly well with “~” and “”, concerning which all 
agree that the fit with their respective English counterparts is a good deal more intuitive. Similarly, CFL 
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 Over the years, informal logicians have been much exercised by CFL’s failure to 
get the connectives right.
6
 This, they say, is a misrepresentation problem. So it is. There 
is a good deal of inclination to regard this misrepresentation as a bad problem. If the se-
mantic penumbrum thesis were true, these critics would be right in the first instance and 
wrong in the second. That is, CFL does misrepresent the connectives, but the damage is 
merely local—that is, it compromises the system’s subsidiary ambitions without laying a 
glove on its principal ambition.  
 Suppose this is so. Suppose that the semantic penumbrum thesis offers a satis-
factory resolution of the Right-Wrong problem. Wouldn’t this mean that informal logi-
cians should revise their position on the misrepresentations occasioned by deductive log-
ic’s logical particles? Shouldn’t they now concede that while those misrepresentations do 
indeed exist they are no longer grounds for complaint? This is a point to which I’ll return. 
3. LOSING NEGATION 
The semantic penumbrum thesis is not without its problems. Here is one of them. Nega-
tion, we might say, begins at home. But consider now negation of a rather distant stripe. 
One of the mainstream approaches to relevant logic is called first order entailment (FDE).  
One of the main approaches to FDE’s semantics is the so-called Routley-star semantics. 
Here, briefly, are the technicalities. In Routley’s possible worlds semantics for FDE, eve-
ry world w has a unique buddy w*, called its star world. An interpretation of FDE is a 
structure W, *, v in which W is a set of worlds, * is a function from worlds to worlds 
satisfying the condition that w** = w, and v is a truth value assignment. Negation is now 
defined as: vw(~Φ) = T if and only if vw*(Φ) = F. That is, it is necessary and sufficient for 
the truth in this world of 
⌐~Φ¬ that Φ be false in its star world. Call this the star condition.  
 It is widely held that FDE gets logical consequence just about right. Since FDE 
is a relevant logic, it accepts the strict condition as necessary but not sufficient for en-
tailment. One of its most interesting features is that its notion of negation answers to 
nothing that qualifies as negation in any sense of “not” in English. This is acknowledged 
by its inventors and supporters.
7
 FDE’s “negation” is negation in no discernible sense.8 
                                                                                                                                                 
doesn’t need “”. It can make do with “”, whose fit with the “all” of English is hardly in doubt. Yes, 
this is so. But it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter because there is no sense of “if  then” in English for 
which 
⌐~(Φ  ~ψ)¬ says ⌐If Φ then ψ¬.  Accordingly, there is no English sentence ⌐If Φ then ψ¬ not mis-
represented by 
⌐~(Φ  ~ψ)¬. Yet it remains true that CFL gets entailment right. 
6
  Not only informal logicians: One of the more instructive early disputes about the tenability of “” pits 
Hugh MacColl against Russell. See, for example, MacColl (1905, 1908a, 1908b). There also exists a 
substantial correspondence between MacColl and Russell, cited in Rahman and Redmond (2008). Here 
is some wise instruction from MacColl: “Thus, Mr. Russell, arguing correctly from the customary con-
vention of logicians, arrives at the strange conclusion that (among Englishmen) we may conclude from 
a man’s red hair that he is  doctor, or from his being a doctor that (whatever appearances may say to the 
contrary) his hair is red” (MacColl 1908a, p. 152). For further dissatisfactions with how CFL handles its 
logical particles, see Adams (1988), Stove (1986), McGee (1985) and Jacquette (1999). These are dis-
cussed in Woods (2004: chapter 3). 
7
  See, in addition to Routley and Routley (1972), Priest (2008). Restall (1999) is an exception. Restall has 
learned to love star negation. 
8
  Thus calling to mind Quine’s words about a different though related thing. Speaking of the dialetheic 
approach to entailment, Quine writes: “To turn to a popular extravaganza, what if someone were to re-
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FDE gets negation dead wrong. Yet it gets entailment dead right, or some near thing. So 
it can’t be a blanket condition on getting entailment right that we get our connectives 
even somewhat right. 
 Why would we think that FDE gets entailment dead right or some near thing? 
We would think it because FDE imposes the strict condition on entailment: Φ entails ψ 
only if it is not possible that Φ  ~ψ. Yes it does. That is, FDE imposes a condition for-
mulable in those words. But how can the following three things be true: that “~” means 
nothing recognizable as negation, that “~” occurs essentially in the wording of the strict 
condition, and that the ensuing meaning of “entails” is close enough to its meaning in 
English to warrant our saying that this very wording gives the strict condition for that 
very sense of entailment—that is, its sense in English? 
 It’s not a sellable proposition. If the definiens of a definiendum invokes no rec-
ognizable concept, the definiendum itself imbibes that limitation. FDE’s star negation is 
one in which negation is unrecognizable. Equally, FDE’s entailment is one in which en-
tailment is unrecognizable. So there is no Right-Wrong Problem for FDE. FDE is wrong 
through and through.  
 We might see in this a critical difference with CFL. If we continue to think that 
CFL gets entailment more right than it gets the English connectives, the Right-Wrong 
Problem remains in effect. As before, it is a problem in need of a solution. If the semantic 
penumbrum thesis were the right way to go, the thesis would hold for CFL and fail for 
FDE. It would fail for FDE if star-negation weren’t in the semantic penumbrum of nega-
tion in English. This has a promising look. For how could star-negation be in the seman-
tic penumbrum of negation in English given that there is in star negation nothing recog-
nizable as negation? 
 A logical connective is in the semantic penumbrum of its English counterpart just 
in case a defining condition of the former is a necessary only or a sufficient only part of the 
definition of the latter. In the case of star negation, we see that 
⌐~Φ¬ is true in this world 
just in case Φ is false in its star world. Informally, ⌐~Φ¬ is true if and only if Φ is not actual-
ly but only possibly false. Of course, Φ’s possible falsity is a necessary condition on its 
actual falsity. But since Φ’s actual falsity is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of 
the star-statement 
⌐~Φ¬, the condition that is necessary and sufficient for the truth of ⌐~Φ¬ 
is neither necessary only or sufficient only for the truth of 
⌐
Not-Φ¬ in English. So star nega-
tion is not in the semantic penumbrum of real negation; and this at least suggests an ex-
ploitable connection between a concept’s not being recognizable in a piece of notation and 
the failure of that notation to be in the semantic penumbrum of the English notation in 
which the concept is fully recognizable. This is a telling concurrence. CFL’s “~” works like 
the “not” of English, sufficiently so that CFL poses a Right-Wrong Problem, where FDE 
trivially does not. (We might say that it poses a Wrong-Wrong Problem.) 
 There is something satisfying about this and something else that is not. The sat-
isfying part is the encouragement to retain semantic penumbrumancy as the explanation 
of what makes the operations of CFL recognizable, what makes them negation-like, con-
                                                                                                                                                 
ject the law of non-contradiction and so accept an occasional sentence and its negation both as true?  
My view  is that neither party knows what he is talking about. They think that they are talking about 
negation, ‘~’, ‘not’; but surely the notation ceased to be recognizable as negation when they took to re-
garding some conjunctions of the form ‘p . ~p’ as true, and stopped regarding such sentences as imply-
ing all others” (Quine 1982: 81). 
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junction-like, conditionality-like, and so on. The unsatisfying part is our decision to retain 
the Right-Wrong Problem for CFL. Doing so would be a mistake, as the FDE case makes 
clear. Here is why. 
 In its most circumspect formulation, the Right-Wrong thesis is that CFL gets the 
entailment relation pretty close to right, certainly more so than it gets its connectives 
right. We had no difficulty in seeing that the unrecognizability of negation in FDE’s “~” 
made for the unrecognizability of entailment in FDE’s term for it. The same applies here, 
only less dramatically. That the English operations are only somewhat recognizable in 
CFL’s connectives makes entailment equally recognizable in CFL’s “entails”, namely 
somewhat only. CFL does no better as an analysis of entailment than it does an analysis 
of the operations to which the English connectives correspond. It is a truth of English that 
Φ entails ψ only if it is necessarily the case that if Φ then ψ. In CFL, this is likened to 
⌐Necessarily, Φ  ψ¬. But there is no sense of “if  then” in English for which ⌐Φ  ψ¬ 
conveys that if Φ then ψ. So, as regards entailment, the gap between English and CFL is 
no laughing matter. It provides that CFL gets entailment wrong. Not dead wrong, but 
wrong enough to notice. 
 In what we’ve been saying so far, CFL has been a stand-in for one’s favourite 
formal logic of entailment. Some may think, as Lewis himself did (and MacColl before 
him), that modal logic is a better instrument for that purpose, made so by the fact that, not 
only does it impose the strict condition on entailment, but it also says what the strict con-
dition means. Both logics call upon possibility in their definitions of entailment. But 
wouldn’t a logic that tells us how possibility actually goes give us a richer grasp of en-
tailment? Wouldn’t a logic that tells us what possibility means give us a deeper apprecia-
tion of entailment? Yes it would. At least, it would to the extent to which possibility is 
recognizable in the logic’s symbol for it, “”. In some modal systems, possibility is not 
recognizable in “”. In others “”is more possibility-like. (Think of S2 in the first in-
stance and of S5 in the second.) The possibility-likeness question turns out to be harder 
than it might have appeared to be.
9
  
4. CONCEPTUAL INDIVIDUATION 
The present suggestion, that the sense of “entails” captured by those modal systems of logic 
that come closest to the meaning of “entails” in English, still leaves a non-trivial gap be-
tween them. Let S5 stand in for them all. There is a body of opinion—but not a shred of 
even informal proof—that the necessities of S5 are valid statements, which in turn are 
statements true solely in virtue of their logic forms.
10
 Accordingly, the entailments of S5 
would be given by sentences 
⌐Necessarily (Φ  ψ)¬—and, equivalently, ⌐~Possibly (Φ  
~ψ)¬—made true solely by their logical forms. The present suggestion also carries the as-
sumption that the meaning that S5 assigns to “entails” incorporates the clause “in virtue of 
logical form”. If this is so, if the meaning of “entails” is such that no sentence made true by 
                                                 
9
  The trouble is that it is not at all easy to see whether there actually are senses of “possible” in English which 
are recognizable in any of the varying provisions the large family of modal logics makes for “”. So far 
“nothing constitutes even an informal ‘proof’” that these recognizabilities exist. See Burgess (2009: 65). 
10
  On this same view, the necessities of S4 are demonstrabilities—that is, sentences provable by virtue of 
logical form alone. 
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considerations other than—or independently of—logical form is an entailment in the S5 
sense, then there are large classes of entailments in English that aren’t true in the S5 sense. 
Consider here entailments flowing from genus-species relations (“The figure is square” 
entails “The figure is rectangular”) and from determinate-determinable connections (“The 
shirt is red” entails “The shirt is coloured”). Informal logicians have a large stake in under-
standing informal entailments of these sorts. But these examples have no standing in S5. 
So, again, why this deference to S5 (and the others, as may be)?  
 “Yes, of course. But the fact remains, doesn’t it, that S5’s concept is indeed like 
the one in English, and like enough to make it possible for people interested in the infor-
mal entailments of English to learn something about them by attending to what entail-
ments are like in S5?” It is an interesting suggestion, well worth some sympathetic atten-
tion. If it were true, the following might also be true. It might be that there is a concept of 
entailment which is instantiated by formal sentences in the ways chronicled by S5, and 
which is also instantiated in English by, among others, those entailments to which genus-
species and determinate-determinable relations give rise. Thus it would be the same con-
cept differently instantiated—that is, with different extensions—in S5 and English. What 
is more, there would be a critical respect in which S5 would have beaten informal logic to 
the punch. S5 would have told us what this shared concept actually is. It would have told 
us what “entails” in S5 means, and in so doing it also would have told us what “entails” 
means in English. S5 has proved loads of theorems about entailment, hence loads of theo-
rems about entailment in English. 
 What is wanted now is a credible, similarity claim with respect to CFL’s entail-
ment in relation to the entailment of English. We want the same for that veritable plethora 
of different and often incompatible formalizations of that same relation—for K, S4, S5 
and so on. Consider now the strict condition on any reading of it in which “~” is recog-
nizable as negation, “~” as conjunction and “possibly” as possibility; thus satisfying the 
semantic penumbrum condition in each instance. Let F be the family of distinct sets of 
entailments generated by fulfillment of the strict condition on each such different reading 
of it. Supposing that there is a generic relation of entailment, we might suppose that each 
member of F is a distinct species of that generic relation. What is more, since on each 
reading entailment is defined via negation, conjunction and possibility, these readings too 
define species of the generic operations of negation, conjunction and possibility. Here, 
too, particle similarity would be specieshood of a common genus. 
 One of the attractions of the genus-species approach to the logic of entailment is 
that it permits recognition of logic’s sprawling pluralism without the necessity of a nihil-
istic relativism in which there is no fact of the matter about entailment except relative to 
the system that defines it. Here is why.  
 Consider a different case. There are different and incompatible ways of being a 
species of mammal—think of whales and us for example. But there is only one way of 
being a mammal. Suppose, as regards some species, there were a good theory T of what 
it took for any member of it to be a mammal. Then T would be a good theory of what it 
took for any mammalian of any species to be a mammal. This would be so even if the 
intersection of all the species were empty. If the genus-species parallel held for entail-
ment, then the CFL, K, S4 and S5 entailments would all resemble generic entailment in 
ways that constitute them as species of it. CFL would be a good theory of the generic 
relation of entailment notwithstanding that its sentences constitute a distinct species of it. 
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Each specific relation would be sufficiently similar to the generic relation to make each 
of them recognizable as entailment.  
 This would be interesting news if true. It would vindicate an informal logician’s 
deference to formal logic in matters pertaining to argument-validity, consistency and the 
like. It would allow us to reconsider the Right-Wrong Problem. If, for example, entail-
ment
S5 
were the same concept as entailment
E 
then we would have it that the semantic gap 
between the connectives of S5 and English doesn’t carry over to their respective concepts 
of entailment. Hence the Question is revived (but not answered).  
 There would be further benefits. Here is one of them. With the exception of au-
toepistemic logics, all of computer science’s defeasibility logics arise from classical logic 
by attaching to classical entailment various and shifting families of conditions.
11
 In all 
these systems connectives are interpreted classically.
12
 Let D be the class of these defea-
sibility logics. Every member of D represents its consequence relation as obtaining solely 
in virtue of logical form. In recent years, informal logicians have been much preoccupied 
with defeasible reasoning in English. For the most part, their investigations proceed with-
out engagement of anything that goes on in D. In rare exceptions, items in D is men-
tioned, but without any consideration of the possibility that the concepts of defeasible 
consequence in D are different from the concepts instantiated by defeasible reasoning in 
English. Whereupon our earlier question recurs. Is any of the D-concepts of defeasible 
consequence the same as any concept of defeasible consequence instantiated by defeasi-
ble reasoning in English? Or are they all different? 
 Once again, it would be interesting if it turned out that for any concept of defea-
sible consequence instantiated in English there is a D-concept with which it is identical. 
For here, too, we could say that D-logicians had got a step on informal logicians. We 
would say that D-logicians had actually got around to saying what “defeasibly entails” 
means and, in those cases in which the concept is instantiated in English, they would also 
have managed to say what “defeasibly entails” means in English. 
 The key to it all is concept-identity. When concept C and concept C* are the 
same concept, there are conditions in virtue of which this is so. Following Quine, let’s 
call these conditions the identity conditions for the concepts in question. Quine is famous 
for saying that an acquaintance with a thing’s identity conditions enables us to know 
where it ends and another thing of like kind begins. Quine is even more famous for think-
ing that in the absence of identity conditions we can’t know what we’re talking about. I 
myself demur from this grim sort of epistemological Puritanism. But I readily agree that 
it sometimes matters to claims one makes or entertains about given concepts whether they 
are indeed the same concept. In such cases identity conditions are fair game; for they are 
invited not imposed. 
                                                 
11
  Autoepistemic logics are made so by the addition to its classical connectives of the so-called introspec-
tive modal operator. Two other exceptions are the theory of defeasible inheritance sets and the abstract 
theory of argument defect. In these cases, the role of logical connectives is much diminished. A third excep-
tion, on its fact at least, are systems of logic programming with negation-as failure. But David Makinson 
claims, and I agree with him, that there are ways to “reclassify” these rules (Makinson 2005: chapter 4). 
12
  So it would be as wrong to think of defeasibility logics as rivals of classical logics, as it would be wrong 
to think of S5 as a rival of CFL. 
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 So let us ask: Are there identity conditions for what concerns us here? Do we 
have a principled means of determining whether S5’s concept of entailment is the same 
as the English concept, and whether there is a concept of D-entailment which is the same 
as the defeasible concept instantiated in English? At this writing, the concept-identity 
project has achieved no foothold in logic, informal or otherwise.
13
 This matters for infor-
mal logic and for formal logic alike. It matters because informal logic has not produced a 
semantics for entailment and defeasible entailment, and formal logic has. If the formal 
concepts are the same as the informal ones, there is no definitional loss for informal logic 
to make up. When it comes to the exposure of meaning, formal logic will already have 
done that work. It will have done that work provided the respective concepts are the 
same. On the other hand, if concept-identity theory leaves the identity of entailment
E 
and 
entailment
S5 
unpronounced upon, the possibility that they are not the same cannot be 
shirked, and, with it, the possibility that on the score of validity informal logic’s defer-
ence to formal logic is more hopeful than justified.  
 At present we don’t know whether the formal and English concepts of entail-
ment are the same. We should try to find out. There is a challenging and necessary re-
search programme which informal logicians should take up. It bids the logician to 
achieve some acquaintance with the concept-identity project in philosophy. There is work 
to do and careers to be made. 
 There is another thing informal logicians might consider worthwhile. It is to 
bring themselves up to date on the state of play in formal theories of that burgeoning 
class of consequence relations mentioned just above. For—supposing that the concept-
identity thesis were true—how else are they going to find out what “entails” means in 
English, in whatever semantic variations as may be present there? 
  
                                                 
13
  The concept project is starting to gear up in philosophy. State of the art information is liberally available 
in Margolis and Laurence (1999). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As not uncommonly happens with John Woods’ papers, he tackles such difficult prob-
lems with such a wealth of ideas that one might spend the whole conference trying to get 
to grips with them. Faced with such a circumstance what is a poor commentator to do in 
ten minutes? Well, the short answer to that is that I’m going to make a criticism, a reply 
(or at least the beginnings of one), an endorsement and a proposal. My comments will, in 
dire necessity, be brief. 
2. A CRITICISM 
Though the term “semantic prenumbrum” is Woods’, the idea behind it, that the logical 
particles of English cast semantic shadows within which the logical particles of formal 
languages may (or may not) fall, has appealed to a number of philosophers, especially 
logicians touting their connectives (and especially if those connectives are new and unu-
sual). Woods admirably attempts to make this notion precise by means of his two-part 
penumbrum condition, viz.: 
 
If K
F
 is a logical particle of a logical system and K
E
 its counterpart in English, 
then K
F
 is in the semantic penumbrum of K
E
 just in case either: 
(1) there is a condition necessary and sufficient for the truth of a KF-statement that is 
sufficient but not necessary for the truth of the counterpart K
E
-statement; 
or 
(2) there is a condition necessary and sufficient for the truth of a KF-statement which 
is necessary but not sufficient for the truth of the counterpart K
E
-statement. 
This is a brave attempt, though it has its problems. The condition as stated will place 
classical, truth-functional disjunction in the penumbrum of the English conjunction, and 
classical truth-functional conjunction in the penumbrum of the English disjunction. In the 
first case: it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the truth of an English con-
junction that at least one of its conjuncts be true, while it is a necessary and a sufficient 
condition for the truth of “p  q” that at least one of its disjuncts be true. In the second 
case, it is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the truth of an English disjunc-
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tion (at least some of them) that both of its disjuncts be true, while it is a sufficient and a 
necessary condition for the truth of “p  q” that both its conjuncts be true. 
 But, although I can’t endorse Woods’s version of the penumbrum condition, I 
cannot praise too highly his attempt to state such a condition precisely. The notion of a 
semantic penumbrum has been appealed to repeatedly, but very little has been done to 
explicate the notion precisely, carefully, and in full generality. I don’t despair that some 
less elegant condition may work.
1
 
3. A REPLY 
The point on which I want to reply concerns negation, perhaps of all connectives the one with 
the murkiest penumbrum (or perhaps, indeed, penumbra). Though sometimes hailed as the 
simplest of logical notions, it is nonetheless the one which lies at the heart of many deep philo-
sophical issues. What part of ‘not’ don’t we understand? Pretty much all of it, in my view. 
 Here I want to defend relevant negation, the type of formal negation used in 
Routley and Routley’s system of first degree entailment as well as in most standard rele-
vant systems, from Woods’s charge that relevant negation is no more a form of negation 
than a blunderbuss is a form of buss, to redirect Anderson and Belnap’s old joke about 
material implication (1975: 5). The semantics of relevant negation are given by Routley’s 
star rule, namely: 
V(A,w) = T    iff      V(A,w*) = F 
in contrast to the rule for classical negation: 
V(A,w) = T    iff      V(A,w) = F. 
And the issue is that it seems counter-intuitive that A should be true in a set-up w, iff A 
is false, not in that set-up, but in some other set up w*.
2
 How can such a thing be any-
thing like negation in English? Woods is not the first to object to it: the chorus of opposi-
tion has been sizeable and enduring, starting with Copeland (1979) and van Benthem 
(1979). What I want to suggest—though this is possibly the toughest audience in the 
world to which to sell the Routley star—is that, while relevant negation is not identical to 
ordinary language negation (if there is one such thing), it shares enough with it to count 
as a recognizable form of negation. My arguments are not original, most of them come 
from Routley et al. (1982). 
 Consider, first, the formal requirements commonly imposed on negation. They 
may be placed in the following four groups: 
                                                 
1 On reflection, I think that Woods is quite right not to flinch at my point about disjunction and conjunc-
tion. It is, indeed, quite plausible to suppose that dual operations will share a penumbral overlap. On the 
other hand, the point does indicate the weakness of the present condition, and suggest that there are 
stronger ones waiting to be discovered. 
2 I follow the original terminology (Routley and Routley 1972; Routley and Meyer 1973) in speaking of 
‘set-ups’ here, but terminology has fluctuated. Routley et al. (1982) and Mares (2004) use ‘situations’, 
Routley and Plumwood (1986) use ‘worlds’; Restall (1999) uses ‘states’. 
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1. Double negation (both ways) 
 A  A and A  A 
2. Various inversion principles, notably: 
 modus tollens    A  B, B |-A 
 and contraposition in all forms, notably: A  B  B  A 
3. De Morgan principles 
 e.g.  (A  B)  A  B 
    (A  B) A  B 
  and their converses. 
4. No contradiction and excluded middle 
 (4a)  (A  A) and (4b) A  A 
 
Of these groups of principles, relevant negation satisfies all but the last.  
 Moreover, its rejection of group 4 is principled and pretty much inevitable, given 
the entire purpose of relevant logic, which (essentially) is to ensure that deductive reason-
ing can continue in the presence of inconsistency. The laws of no contradiction and ex-
cluded middle place consistency and completeness constraints on set-ups. Sets-ups may 
be regarded as sets of propositions, so that the classical negation rule, which validates 
(4a) and (4b) on all set-ups, can be written: 
V(A, w) = T   iff   A  w 
But this simply eliminates from consideration the sets of propositions which contain both 
A and A and those which contain neither. But it was precisely the purpose of relevant 
logic to enable deductive reasoning to continue when such circumstances were in play. Ac-
cordingly, the classical rule has to go—or else we have to give up any hope of being able to 
use formal logic to argue sensibly about inconsistent or incomplete sets of propositions. 
 Of course, this does not in itself validate the star rule. So how do we get to star? 
One obvious requirement on the negation rule is that it preserve compositionality - that is, 
that the valuation of A depend upon the valuation of A. But, as we have just seen, the 
valuation of A in w cannot depend upon the valuation of A in w. So it must depend up-
on the valuation of A in some other set-up. So what is the set-up w*? In terms of sets of 
propositions, w* is a set of propositions which does not contain any proposition explicitly 
denied in w; that is, it is a set of propositions compatible with the propositions in w. 
 Formally: 
V(A, w) = T   iff   A   w* 
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It is, in fact, the maximal set of such propositions. And it has some other nice properties, 
too. It is closed under deduction (there’s a proof in Routley et al.: 133) and, given the De 
Morgan laws, it is unique (proof: ibid.: 134). 
 So A is true in a set-up w iff A is false in the maximal set-up compatible with 
w. It looks almost commonsensical. But why can’t w itself be the maximal set-up com-
patible with w? Because, if we acknowledge that set-ups may be inconsistent, as we have 
to if we are to get an adequate account of entailment free of the paradoxes of strict impli-
cation, then we have to allow for the possibility that w may not be compatible with itself! 
On the other hand, if we restrict our attention to set-ups which are consistent and com-
plete, then relevant negation behaves just like classical, Boolean negation. So if you think 
Boolean negation is a bit ‘not’-ish, then you ought to think that relevant negation is also a 
bit ‘not’-ish, for there is a robust, philosophical sense in which relevant negation is an 
extension of, a generalization of, classical negation. Woods called for ‘negation-
likeness’—I think relevant negation has it in spades. 
4. AN ENDORSEMENT 
What I want to endorse strongly is Woods’s conceptual-identity project. It is actually 
quite scandalous, when you come to think about it, how little effort philosophers put in to 
establishing identity conditions for the types of items that they typically regard as their 
stock-in-trade—concepts, propositions, and theories come immediately to mind. Given 
their importance in philosophy, one would expect their identity conditions to be the sub-
ject of tenacious debate. Yet little is said on the topic. I agree with Woods in rejecting 
Quine’s ‘grim epistemological Puritanism’ which would require identity conditions to be 
specified before you could be said to know what you are talking about. But the converse 
does seem to me to hold: if you can specify an item’s identity conditions then you have a 
pretty good handle on what you are talking about. 
5. A PROPOSAL 
Finally, the proposal I want to make concerns a possible way of pursuing the identity 
conditions project which may prove fruitful. Concepts nest together. They typically nest 
in theories (or other, looser, intellectual structures), where, like other nestlings, they not 
untypically have to adjust to the demands on nest space made by their companions. It 
may well be that a useful way to establish the identity conditions of a concept is to con-
sider its role, vis-à-vis other concepts, in the intellectual structures in which it is em-
ployed. Such an approach, I think, will encourage our affection for relevant negation, for 
it surely plays a negationy role in relevant logic. 
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I am extremely grateful to have Professor Griffin’s endorsement and proposal, as well as 
the benefits of his criticisms, which if left standing would augur ill for my project. So I 
want in this short reply to make some effort to subdue the trouble they threaten. 
 The first criticism has to do with the very idea of semantic penumbra. Griffin is 
entirely right to notice that, as defined here, formal conjunctions can be in the semantic 
penumbra of disjunctions in English, and ditto for formal disjunctions and English con-
junctions. Perhaps at first blush this is too much to bear, giving to semantic penumbra a 
latitude that dissipates the usefulness I claim for them. On thinking it over, however, it is 
the appearance of over-reach that dissipates, occasioned by the fact that conjunction and 
disjunction are one another’s duals. So they are bound to exhibit some penumbrial overlap. 
 Where Griffin’s worry was that I was too soft on semantic penumbra, he finds 
that I am too hard on star negation. Consider the negation sign “~” under the star interpre-
tation. I say that if the truth of 
⌐~Φ¬ in a given set-up is guaranteed by the possible, not 
actual, falsity of Φ in that set-up, there is in English no sense of the expression “it is not 
the case that ” in which if Φ is possibly but not actually false ⌐it is not the case that Φ¬. 
So (I said) there is in this sense of “~” nothing recognizable as negation. 
 Against this, Griffin rightly points out that star negation appears to behave re-
markably like real (as anyhow recognizable) negation in a variety of telling contexts. 
Double negation holds for star negation, as do modus tollens and the DeMorgan equiva-
lences. Isn’t star negation negation-like in these contexts? Doesn’t this make negation 
recognizable here? 
 Consider a case. We have a formalization in which “~” means “It is disbelieved 
by Sarah Palin that ”. The system is carefully rigged to have it come out that here too 
double negation, modus tollens and the DeMorgan equivalences all hold. In particular, 
⌐
It 
is disbelieved by Sarah Palin that Φ that it is disbelieved by Sarah Palin that Φ¬ is equiva-
lent to Φ. Is “~” now recognizable as negation” Who would believe it? 
 Of course, the system I am alluding to here would have to go to considerable and 
ad hoc lengths to make Sarah-negation dance to these standard-seeming equivalences and 
rules. But is there a modern logician alive who thinks that ad hocery is off-limits in logic? 
 To my mind, something quite interesting falls out of the Sarah-negation exam-
ple. It is beyond contention that nothing recognizable as negation is to be found in Sarah-
negation. Yet, if you’re clever enough, you can deploy Sarah-negation as the negations of 
those standard-seeming equivalences and rules. What does this tell us? It tells us that rec-
ognizability as negation and negation-likeness are not equivalent notions. It also tells us 
that negation-likeness is not sufficient for negation-recognizability. 
 A small last point on worlds. Griffin thinks that, owing to their susceptibility to 
inconsistency, we should not think of star worlds as possible worlds, and recommends 
instead a more neutral name such as “set-up”. I don’t mind. Nothing I have to say against 
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star negation is predicated on the idea that some possible worlds are actually inconsistent. 
Let us note, however, that in the mainstream worlds semantics for intensional logics, 
there is not one word of instruction about what possible worlds are, beyond their purely 
formal characterization as elements of a non-empty set governed by a binary relation. On 
any such approach to modal logic, the invocation of worlds will tell us what “possible” 
means, but not what “possible world” means. So I am also happy with an occasional pos-
sibly impossible world—for consideration of the analysis, say, of contralogical subjunc-
tive conditionals.  
